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Abstract
The standard theory of coherent risk measures fails to consider individual insti-
tutions as part of a system which might itself experience instability and spread
new sources of risk to the market participants. In compliance with an approach
adopted by Shapley and Shubik (1969), this paper proposes a cooperative market
game where agents and institutions play the same role can be developed. We take
into account a multiple institutions framework where some of them jointly expe-
rience distress events in order to evaluate their individual and collective impact
on the remaining institutions in the market. To carry out this analysis, we de-
fine a new risk measure (SCoES), generalising the Expected Shortfall of Acerbi
(2002) and we characterise the riskiness profile as the outcome of a cost cooperative
game played by institutions in distress (a similar approach was adopted by Denault
2001). Each institution’s marginal contribution to the spread of riskiness towards
the safe institutions in then evaluated by calculating suitable solution concepts of
the game such as the Banzhaf–Coleman and the Shapley–Shubik values.
Keywords: Cooperative market game, Shapley Value, risk measures, Value–at–
Risk, expected shortfall, systemic risk.
1 Introduction
The assessment of financial risk in a multi–institution framework when some institutions
are subject to systemic or non–systemic distress is one of the main topics of the latest
years which received large attention from scholars in Mathematical Finance, Statis-
tics, Management, see, e.g., Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011, 2016), Billio et al. (2012),
Acharya et al. (2012), Girardi and Ergün (2013), Hautsch et al. (2014), Engle et al. (2014),
Lucas et al. (2014), Bernardi and Catania (2015), Sordo et al. (2015), just to quote a
few of the most relevant approaches. For an extensive and up to date survey on sys-
temic risk measures, see Bisias et al. (2012), while the recent literature on systemic risk
is reviewed by Benoit et al. (2016). Especially since 2008, Lehmann Brothers’ collapse
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and the subsequent debt crisis contagion across Europe raised crucial issues and ques-
tions to be addressed by new macroeconomic and financial models. In particular, such
events and the related consequences provoked a wide increase in investigation of instru-
ments possibly suitable for risk evaluation, thereby targeting the occurrence of contagion
among institutions in distress (see, among others, Drehmann and Tarashev 2013 on the
theoretical side and Huang et al. 2012a and Huang et al. 2012b on the empirical side).
In this paper we are going to investigate circumstances where one or more market
institutions undergo financial distress and may spread the contagion to the remaining
safe institutions in the market. Financial distress has a straightforward meaning: a
condition of dramatic financial instability of an institution, or lack of ability to fully
repay its creditors, or even the preliminary to bankruptcy or liquidation. Although “fi-
nancial distress” and “default” are sometimes used interchangeably, there may be some
differences, often depending either on each country’s specific bankruptcy law or on the
institution’s rating and so on (see Altman and Hotchkiss 2010 for an extensive discus-
sion).
When a financial distress takes place in the market, each distressed institution af-
fects the safe ones and individually contributes to the systemic risk. A crucial aspect
of the contagion frameworks is the assessment of each agent’s (i.e. each institution’s)
marginal effect on systemic risk. In order to evaluate such contributions, a natural and
intuitive tool is the Shapley value (see Shapley 1988), as well as the Banzhaf value (see
Banzhaf III 1965 and Owen 1995). It is interesting to note that, although his world
famous theories did not concern financial markets specifically, L.S. Shapley, Nobel Lau-
reate in Economic Sciences in 2012, proposed a relevant application to market analysis
in a paper with M. Shubik in 1969 (see Shapley and Shubik 1969). In that paper, Shap-
ley and Shubik defined and investigated the direct markets (see Shapley and Shubik
(1969), pp. 15–18), i.e., markets where, since each trader possessed one initial unit of a
personal commodity, traders might be identified with commodities. As the Authors put
it literally, “A canonical market form – the direct market – is introduced, in which the
commodities are in effect the traders themselves, made infinitely divisible...” (p. 11),
hence that was the first attempt to model a cooperative game where agents had a twice
nature: traders and assets at the same time.
Hence, classical solution concepts widely used in Cooperative Game Theory such as
the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value fit our evaluation purposes. In more recent
times, cooperative game theory has already been employed for risk capital allocation by
Denault (2001) and in the latest years by Csóka et al. (2009) and Abbasi and Hosseinifard
(2013)1. However, in none of the above papers a characteristic value expressing the dif-
ference between an expected value in a non–distressed case and an expected value in a
distressed–case has been taken into account.
The financial setup we are going to investigate involves a set of possibly distressed
institutions (for example a set of banks) and a set of safe institutions. Our purpose
is an assessment of the contagion risk, i.e., the extent to which the safe institutions
can be affected and damaged by the financial distress of the unsafe ones. For this pur-
pose, risk measures have been extensively theorized and analyzed, giving rise to a rich
strand of literature. Some of them might provide helpful techniques for risk allocation
among a number of distinct systemic agents. In this respect, the coherent risk mea-
1A mechanism for allocation of risk capital to subportfolios of pooled liabilities has been proposed by
Tsanakas and Barnett in 2003 (see Tsanakas and Barnett 2003) and by Tsanakas in 2009 (see Tsanakas
2009), based on the Aumann–Shapley value.
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sures have been and are a crucial tool for the assignment of risk capital, both for the
richness of properties due to their axiomatic structure and for their adaptability to fit
several financial frameworks. The basic studies on coherent risk measures have been
published by Artzner et al. (1999) in 1999, who first provided an axiomatic character-
ization. Subsequently, in 2001 Denault (2001) developed the analysis by taking into
account a cooperative game structure, where players are the firms involved in risky fi-
nancial activities, and the risk induced by the net worth of firms is the value of the
characteristic function of the game, and the subadditivity axiom naturally induces a
cost cooperative game.
The coherence of the Expected Shortfall (ES, hereafter) was taken into account
by Acerbi and Tasche (2002) in 2002, whereas an axiomatic approach was adopted
in 2005 by Kalkbrener (2005), to characterize the related capital allocation proce-
dures in portfolio management or performance measurement. In recent years, further
mathematical results were achieved by Stoica (2006) (equivalence between properties
of some coherent measures with no arbitrage conditions), Csóka et al. (2007, 2009)
(refinement of measures in a general equilibrium setup, stability of risk allocations),
Kountzakis and Polyrakis (2013) (applications to general equilibrium models). Other
relevant results in risk allocation theory were provided in Drehmann and Tarashev
(2013) and Csóka and Pintér (2016). Furthermore, as a slightly different tool, distortion
risk measures have been applied to a financial contagion framework by Cherubini and Mulinacci
(2014).
The new approach we are going to propose builds on an alternative risk measure
which is an extension of ES and which is supposed to incorporate the effect of the dis-
tressed institutions on a safe one. Such a measure, denoted by SCoESτ1|τ2
i|D , represents
the expected value of a non–distressed institution i conditional upon a set D of institu-
tions under distress, given two different thresholds τ1, τ2 ∈ (0, 1), specifically related to
the institutions’ returns. Subsequently, in order to evaluate the marginal contribution
of each distressed institution to overall systemic risk, we will construct a cost function.
Such a function aims to measure the cost of risk by evaluating the mean of the differences
between the standard Expected Shortfalls and the values of SCoES of all non–distressed
institutions. This formula will be the characteristic value of a cooperative game played
by distressed institutions. Adopting a classical approach, we will examine the properties
of the game and calculate the marginal impacts of each distressed institution, pointing
out the differences between the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value of the game.
The introduced risk measurement framework is then adopted to empirically analyze
the evolution of the SCoES risk measure and the output of the associated cooperative
game of risk for eight Eurozone sovereign Credit Default Swaps (CDS) over the period
2008–2014. Our example assumes the Germany as the “safe” country, and explores how
the evolution of the remaining countries’ debt conditions affect the health and finan-
cial stability of Germany considered as a “proxy” for the overall European system. As
a byproduct of the proposed risk framework, the evolution of the total impact of the
failure of the European system is monitored. Our results show that the risk of failure
of the European system displays a transitory high level during period in between the
Greece and Portugal bailouts (November 2010 – May 2011), but effectively remains at
high levels when the ECB president Mario Draghi announces the implementation of the
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)
in the months thereafter. It is only after the implementation of the OMT, and the ESM,
that the systemic risk of Germany settles more permanently at a level that is roughly
3
60% lower than during the crisis.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the basic concepts
about risk measures will be recalled, together with some axiomatic details of coherent
measures. Section 3 introduces the indicators that will be crucial to our analysis, whereas
in Section 4 the cooperative game of risk and its solution concepts are exposed and dis-
cussed. Section 5 is devoted to the empirical application and Section 6, conclusions and
possible future developments are laid out.
2 Risk measures in portfolio management
Here we will outline the standard notation for risk measurement in recent literature,
largely borrowed from the seminal paper by Artzner Artzner et al. (1999) and Kalkbrener
(2005).
Consider a finite set of states of nature Ω, whose cardinality is |Ω| = m. Call X(ωj)
a random variable indicating the final net worth of a position in state ωj ∈ Ω after a
certain time interval, i.e., the possible profit and loss realization of a portfolio in state
ωj . We can identify the set of all real-valued functions (which can also be viewed as the
set of all risks) on Ω as Rm, whose elements are of the kind X = (X(ω1), . . . , X(ωm)).
In the rigorous construction proposed in Artzner et al. (1999), a measure of risk is a
mapping ρ : Rm −→ R such that ρ(X) corresponds to the minimum amount of extra
cash an agent has to add to her risky portfolio, in order to ensure that this investment is
still acceptable to the regulator2 when using a suitable reference instrument. The basic
requirement concerns the price of the asset: 1 is the initial price of the asset and r > 0
is the total return on the reference instrument at a final date T , in all possible states of
nature. In Artzner et al. (1999) the Definition of a coherent measure is then provided
based on an axiomatic structure.
Definition 1. A function ρ : RS −→ R is called a coherent measure of risk if it
satisfies the following axioms:
- Monotonicity (M): for all X,Y ∈ Rm such that Y ≥ X (i.e. Y (ωj) ≥ X(ωj) for
almost all ωj ∈ Ω), ρ(Y ) ≤ ρ(X).
- Subadditivity (S): for all X,Y ∈ Rm, ρ(X + Y ) ≤ ρ(X) + ρ(Y ).
- Positive Homogeneity (PH): for all X ∈ Rm and λ ∈ R+, ρ(λX) = λρ(X).
- Translation Invariance (TI)3: for all X ∈ Rm and h ∈ R,
ρ(X + hr) = ρ(X)− h.
We have to point out that the Value-at-Risk (V aR) satisfies all of them except Subaddi-
tivity, as is precisely exposed in Artzner et al. (1999) as well as the standard Definition
of V aR, which is recalled here:
Definition 2. Given τ ∈ [0, 1] and the return on a reference instrument r > 0, the V aR
at level τ of the final net worth X with probability P {·} is the negative of the quantile
at level τ of X/r, i.e.
V aRτ = − inf {x | P {X ≤ r · x} ≥ τ} .
2This property relies on the acceptance sets, which are axiomatized in Artzner et al. (1999).
3Property TI is sometimes denoted as Risk Free Condition (RFC).
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Without loss of generality, in the remainder of the paper, r will be normalized to 1.
Back to coherent measures, when the outcomes are equiprobable, i.e. when the state
of nature ωj occurs with probability pj and p1 = · · · = pm = 1/m, a special and relevant
case can be treated, as was investigated by Acerbi (2002). In particular, we take into ac-
count an ordered statistics given by the ordered values of them-tupleX(ω1), . . . , X(ωm),
i.e.
{
X˜1, . . . , X˜m
}
, rearranged in increasing order: X˜1 ≤ · · · ≤ X˜m. The definition of
spectral measure of risk we are going to present is due to Csóka et al. (2007), who
slightly modified Acerbi’s original definition by employing a positive discount factor δ,
not necessarily equal to 1 as in Acerbi (2002).
Definition 3. If the outcomes are equiprobable, given a vector Φ ∈ Rm and a discount
factor δ > 0, the risk measure MΦ : R
m −→ R defined as follows:
MΦ(X) = −δ
m∑
j=1
ΦjX˜j , (1)
is called a spectral measure of risk if Φ satisfies the following axioms:
- Nonnegativity (N1): Φj ≥ 0 for all j = 1, . . . ,m.
- Normalization (N2): Φ1 + · · ·+Φm = 1.
- Monotonicity (M): Φj is non-increasing, i.e. for all u, v ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, u < v
implies Φu ≥ Φv.
A well-known spectral measure of risk is the one indicating the discounted average
of the worst τ outcomes, i.e. the τ-Expected Shortfall of X . For all τ ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
it is given by
ESτ (X) = −
δ
τ
τ∑
j=1
X˜j . (2)
When X is a continuous random variable, its formula reads as follows:
ES1−λ(X) = −
δ
1− λ
∫
X˜≤V aR(X˜)=τ
x˜f(x˜)dx, (3)
where f(·) is the law of X˜ and 1 − λ is the related confidence level. The proof of
the coherence of ES1−λ(·) in the continuous random variable setup can be found in
Acerbi and Tasche (2002).
3 The SCoES as a risk measure
Here we propose a generalisation of the Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016)’s CoV aR and
CoES, namely System–CoV aR (SCoV aR) and System–CoES (SCoES). The pro-
posed risk measures aim to capture interconnections among multiple connecting market
participants which is particularly relevant during periods of financial market crisis, when
several institutions may contemporaneously experience distress instances.
Let P = {1, . . . , p} be a set of p institutions, and assume that the conditioning event
is the distress of a subset of P . Call D = {j1, . . . , jd} ⊂ P the set of d institutions
potentially under distress, whose cardinality is such that 0 < d < p, hence meaning that
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at least one institution is not under distress and that at least one is under distress. If we
consider a set S ⊆ D of distressed institutions, such set represents a group of institutions
picked among the ones that may be under distress. As is usual in typical Cooperative
Game Theory literature, we will denominate any group S as a coalition.
D
P
S
Fig. 1: The subset D ⊂ P contains all possible coalitions S of institutions in distress.
Given the confidence levels τ1, τ2, we are going to define the SCoV aR
τ1|τ2
i|S of institution
i ∈ P for all institutions not belonging to D as follows. We are going to assume that at
least one distressed institution has a negative return, i.e., that there exists at least one
Xj < 0, to ensure possible positivity of the Expected Shortfall as has been defined by
(2), when δ, τ > 0.
Call Fi|S
(
·,−V aRτ2
(∑
jk∈S
Xjk
))
the joint cumulative density function of institu-
tion i conditional on the set of institutions S being under distress. Denote with FS(·) the
distribution function of the group of institutions S, provided that the involved random
variable coincides with the sum of all returns of the institutions in S.
Definition 4. Let X = (X1, . . . , Xp) be a vector of p institution returns with probability
P{·}. Given a set S ⊆ D of institutions in distress and τ1, τ2 ∈ [0, 1], for all i ∈ P \ D,
the SCoV aR
τ1|τ2
i|S is the following value:
SCoV aR
τ1|τ2
i|S = − inf

l ∈ R | Fi|S(l,m) ≥ τ1,
∑
jk∈S
Xjk ≤ m

 , (4)
where m := − inf
{
s ∈ R | P
{∑
jk∈S
Xjk ≤ s
}
≥ τ2
}
.
An alternative Definition of SCoV aRτ1|τ2
i|S is the following one.
Definition 5. Let X = (X1, . . . , Xp) be a vector of p institution returns with probability
P{·}. Given a set S ⊆ D of institutions in distress and τ1, τ2 ∈ [0, 1], for all i ∈ P \ D,
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the SCoV aR
τ1|τ2
i|S is the maximum value X
∗
i taken by Xi such that
P
{
{Xi ≤ X∗i }
⋂{∑
jk∈S
Xjk ≤ −V aRτ2
(∑
jk∈S
Xjk
)}}
P
{∑
jk∈S
Xjk ≤ −VaRτ2
(∑
jk∈S
Xjk
)} ≥ τ1. (5)
Basically, SCoV aRτ1|τ2
i|S is the Value-at-Risk of an institution subject to the condition
that the sum of the realizations of the institutions under distress do not exceed the
Value-at-Risk of their sum, when two different confidence levels are in general taken
into account. The two following Remarks aim to point out two circumstances where
SCoV aR coincides with the marginal V aR.
Remark 6. In this context it is quite natural to consider the sum as aggregated measure
of risk since we are considering profits and losses. Of course alternative definitions
are possible, as for example, the maximum loss of the distressed institutions, see, e.g.,
Bernardi et al. (2016) and discussion therein.
Remark 7. If all the returns of the institutions in W are independent of all the re-
turns of institutions in D, then the joint c.d.f. Fi|S(·) becomes Fi(·), i.e. the c.d.f. of
institution i ∈W . Consequently,
SCoV aR
τ1|τ2
i|S = − inf {l ∈ R | P {Xi ≤ l} ≥ τ1} = V aRτ1(Xi).
Remark 8. When no institution is under distress, S = ∅, i.e. Xjk = 0 for all jk ∈ S.
In this case, (5) is well-defined too and in particular it collapses to the standard VaR.
Namely,
P


∑
jk∈S
Xjk ≤ −V aRτ2

∑
jk∈S
Xjk



 = 1 =⇒ SCoV aRτ1|τ2i|∅ = V aRτ1(Xi).
The SCoV aR is particularly useful to formulate the risk measure we are going to inves-
tigate.
Definition 9. Given τ1, τ2 ∈ [0, 1] and a set S of institutions in distress, the SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S
is the expected value of institution i ∈ P\D, provided that it does not exceed SCoV aR
τ1|τ2
i|S
and conditional upon the set of institutions S being at the level of their joint ESτ2-level:
SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S ≡ E

Xi | Xi ≤ SCoV aRτ1|τ2i|S , ∑
jk∈S
Xjk ≤ ESτ2

∑
jk∈S
Xjk



 . (6)
As in Remark 8, (6) can be evaluated when no distress occurs too, collapsing to the
standard Expected Shortfall:
SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|∅ = E [Xi |Xi ≤ V aRτ1(Xi)] = ESτ1(Xi).
A short explanation may be helpful to clarify the formulation of (6): the condition∑
jk∈S
Xjk ≤ ESτ2
(∑
jk∈S
Xjk
)
is always verified when all Xjk < 0. On the other
hand, just one negative institution return is enough to determine an open interval for δ
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such that the condition holds. More precisely, if Xj1 , . . . , Xjl are negative, where jk ∈ S
for k = 1, . . . , l, the condition boils down to: δ ≥ −τ2
∑
jk∈S
Xjk∑
l
k=1 Xjk
. Such an estimate is
trivially true whenever all institution returns in a coalition S are negative4.
Getting to analyze possible relations between SCoV aR and SCoES, we can prove
some results.
Proposition 10. Given two coalitions S, S′ ∈ 2D, if the following hypotheses are veri-
fied:
1. SCoV aR
τ1|τ2
i|S′ > SCoV aR
τ1|τ2
i|S ;
2.
∑
jk∈S′
Xjk ≤ ESτ2
(∑
jk∈S′
Xjk
)
;
3.
∑
jk∈S
Xjk ≤ ESτ2
(∑
jk∈S
Xjk
)
,
then SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S′ ≥ SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S .
Proof. If S, S′ ∈ 2D, the first hypothesis ensures that
E
[
Xi | Xi ≤ SCoV aR
τ1|τ2
i|S′
]
≥ E
[
Xi | Xi ≤ SCoV aR
τ1|τ2
i|S
]
,
whereas the second and the third hypotheses guarantee that SCoESτ1|τ2
i|S′ and SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S
are well-defined, consequently
SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S′ ≥ SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S .
In the remainder of the paper, whenever there is no misunderstanding, we are going to
simply denote the above quantities with ES, SCoES, V aR and SCoV aR, to lighten
the notation.
4 A cooperative game for risk allocation induced by
SCoES
The risk allocation problems were introduced by Denault (2001), where the problem of
allocating the risk of a given firm, as measured by a coherent measure of risk, among
its N constituents, was taken into account, closely resembling the typical Cooperative
Game Theory approach. In Denault (2001) cooperative games of cost were employed
to model risk allocation problems, and the chosen solution concepts were the Shapley
value and the Aumann–Shapley value. Such approach was subsequently adopted and
improved in Csóka et al. (2009), where risk allocation games and totally balanced games
4Also note that the estimates on δ are as many as the possible coalitions S except the empty set,
i.e. 2|D| − 1, hence there are at most 2|D| − 1 levels of δ that must be exceeded. Because the choice of
δ in the definition of (2) is arbitrary, taking the maximum level among such values implies that such
condition in (6) is always satisfied, consequently SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S
≡ E
[
Xi | Xi ≤ SCoV aR
τ1 |τ2
i|S
]
for all
i ∈ P \ D.
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are compared to ensure the existence of a stable allocation of risk. In particular, they
define a risk environment characterized by a set of portfolios, a set of states of nature,
a discrete probability density of realization of states, a matrix of realization vectors and
a coherent measure of risk, from which they construct and analyze a risk allocation
game. In both approaches, the portfolios of a firm are looked upon as the players of a
subadditive cooperative game.
In our setting, we are ready to apply the measures defined in Section 3 to institutional
circumstances where distress occurs, and in particular we are going to rely on some
typical tools borrowed from Cooperative Game Theory. In more details, we will look
upon any possible set of distressed institutions as a coalition of a cooperative game
(or TU-game, see Owen 1995). The effect of distress on the remaining institutions,
corresponding to risk of contagion, will be evaluated by means of a cost function.
Call W the set of institutions not belonging to D, i.e. W = P \ D. We can evaluate
the cost of risk induced by any coalition S ⊆ D by taking a weighted arithmetic mean
over all differences between the unconditioned ESτ1 and the SCoES for all institutions
in W , i.e.
cW (S) =
∑
i∈W αi
[
ESτ1(Xi)− SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S
]
|W |
, (7)
where αi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , |W |,
∑|W |
i=1 αi = |W |, for all S ⊆ D.
In the frame of risk allocation, we introduce a cooperative game Γ = (cW ,D), where
D represents the the set of involved portfolios and c : 2D −→ R is as in (7), and assigns
a cost to each coalition S ⊆ D.
The cooperative game approach appears very suitable, in that in an uncertain finan-
cial framework it allows to take into account all possible combinations of institutions
undergoing distress.
Moreover, the couple (cW ,D) actually defines a cooperative game. In fact, when
no institution in D is under distress, then cW (∅) = 0 because all the differences in
the numerator of (7) vanish. Essentially, this hypothesis, which is necessary to define
a cooperative game on D, may have a clear-cut financial interpretation: all the safe
institutions are collected inW , meaning that all of them are secured beyond a reasonable
doubt. They can be viewed as states or companies issuing either government bonds or
securities guaranteed by top-quality collateral, namely all the kinds of agents which
do not involve any risk factors. Also note the positive sign in (7): in standard payoff
cooperative games such sign is reversed. But because we are assuming that below the
confidence level τ1 some realizations XJk are negative, positivity of ESτ1(·) is ensured,
hence the level of risk induced by distress can be positive. However, it may occur that
for some coalition S, cW (S) is non-positive, but this would mean that the contagion is
even less likely to spread from such a group of institutions to the non-distressed ones.
Formula (7) needs some further explanation, in terms of what the differences between
ES and SCoES actually measure. Each difference provides the spread between the
standard risk and the risk which is correlated to the distress of a coalition S, composed
of one institution at least. In order to completely assess the risk effect caused by any
coalition S, the sum of those differences is taken over the whole set of safe institutions
W . Perhaps some structural differences may occur among the safe institutions, including
insurance contracts, implementation of hedging strategies, and so on. Such heterogeneity
can be captured by weights αi in (7), which can also be interpreted as directly dependent
of each single institution, in compliance with its size or its systemic relevance. In order
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to lighten the notation, we are going to hypothesize a simplified scenario where all
institutions’ weights are equal, then we are going to posit α1 = · · · = α|W | = 1.
The issue concerning the properties of the game (7) is somewhat complex, due to
the fact that the SCoES of an institution subject to an external distress is a kind of
measure of correlation, or also a measure of how distress spreads its contagion towards
non-distressed institutions. Consequently, the standard axioms associated to coherent
risk measures can hardly be demonstrated. Instead of an axiomatization, we are going
to outline some characteristics of cW (·), which are listed in the next Propositions. Some
of these properties resemble the axioms stated by Denault (2001).
Proposition 11. Given two coalitions S, S′ ∈ 2D, if the following hypotheses are veri-
fied:
1. SCoV aR
τ1|τ2
i|S′ > SCoV aR
τ1|τ2
i|S ;
2.
∑
jk∈S′
Xjk ≤ ESτ2
(∑
jk∈S′
Xjk
)
;
3.
∑
jk∈S
Xjk ≤ ESτ2
(∑
jk∈S
Xjk
)
,
then cW (S
′) ≤ cW (S).
Proof. It follows directly from the inequality in Proposition 10.
In the following Proposition, the expression λS means that all the institution returns
in S are multiplied by λ, i.e. λXjk , for all jk ∈ S ⊆ D.
Proposition 12. For each λ ∈ R+, cW (λS) = cW (S).
Proof. Applying Definition 5 to λS, for all λ > 0, implies that SCoV aRτ1|τ2
i|λS is the
maximum X∗i such that
P
{
{Xi ≤ X∗i }
⋂{∑
jk∈S
λXjk ≤ −V aRτ2
(∑
jk∈S
λXjk
)}}
P
{∑
jk∈S
λXjk ≤ −V aRτ2
(∑
jk∈S
λXjk
)} ≥ τ1.
By the positive homogeneity of V aR (see either Artzner et al. 1999 or McNeil et al.
2015, p. 74), that expression coincides with (5), hence SCoV aRτ1|τ2
i|λS = SCoV aR
τ1|τ2
i|S .
For all S ∈ 2D, linearity of ES can be employed in the expression of SCoESτ1|τ2
i|λS :
SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|λS ≡ E

Xi | Xi ≤ SCoV aRτ1|τ2i|λS , ∑
jk∈S
λXjk ≤ ESτ2

∑
jk∈S
λXjk




= E

Xi | Xi ≤ SCoV aRτ1|τ2i|S , ∑
jk∈S
Xjk ≤ ESτ2

∑
jk∈S
Xjk




= SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S .
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Finally, cW (λS) can be written as follows:
cW (λS) =
∑
i∈W
[
ESτ1(Xi)− SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|λS
]
|W |
=
∑
i∈W
[
ESτ1(Xi)− SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S
]
|W |
= cW (S). (8)
Proposition 13. For all S ⊆ D such that all the returns Xi, where i ∈ W , are inde-
pendent of all returns Xjk , where jk ∈ S, cW (S) = cW (∅) = 0.
Proof. For all institution returns Xi which are independent of all Xjk (see Remark 7),
where i ∈ W and jk ∈ S ⊆ D, we have that SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S = SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|∅ = ESτ1 [Xi]. If
this holds for all i ∈W , the proof is complete.
Subadditivity is a key feature of cost allocation games. Recall that Γ is subadditive
when its cost function is subadditive, i.e. for all S, T ∈ 2D such that S ∩ T = ∅,
cW (S ∪ T ) ≤ cW (S) + cW (T ) (e.g. Anily and Haviv 2014). As is shown in the next
Proposition, the game(cW ,D) is not always subadditive. In particular, some assumptions
on the related ES and SCoES are supposed to hold.
Proposition 14. If ∀ i ∈ W , ESτ1(Xi) > 0 and SCoES is superadditive, i.e.
SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S∪T ≥ SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S + SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|T ,
then (cW ,D) is subadditive.
Proof. By definition of subadditivity, we can note that for all S, T ∈ 2D, where S∩T = ∅:
cW (S ∪ T )− cW (S)− cW (T ) =
=
∑
i∈W
[
SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S + SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|T − SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S∪T − ESτ1(Xi)
]
|W |
,
then, if ∀ i ∈W , ESτ1(Xi) > 0 and SCoES is superadditive, i.e.
SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S∪T ≥ SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S + SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|T ,
then cW (·) is subadditive.
However, it is difficult and restrictive to impose this condition, because the very defini-
tion of ESτ1 allows both its possible positivity and negativity, depending on the level
at which the worst outcomes are taken.
4.1 Risk allocation
A typical and well-known application of cooperative games is the determination of suit-
able allocations among players who get a share of a total amount, which is a benefit
when they play a payoff game (generally superadditive) and a cost when they play a
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cost game (generally subadditive). In this case, by Proposition 14, subadditivity is not
ensured, but the characteristic function of the game represents a contagion risk induced
by distress of some institutions, hence its interpretation as a cost game sounds intuitive
and natural.
A complete presentation of the several solution concepts and allocation rules in
cooperative games can be found in Owen (1995). The two main values we are going
to apply to our setup are the Shapley-Shubik (first introduced in 1953, see Shapley
1988) and the Banzhaf-Coleman (which was formulated in 1965, see Banzhaf III 1965)
values. What follow are the expressions of such allocation principles when employing
the characteristic function cW (·).
The Shapley value of the game (cW ,D) is given by the d-dimensional vector
Φ(cW ) = (φ1(cW ), . . . , φd(cW )) such that:
φjk(cW ) =
∑
jk∈S, S⊆D
(d− |S|)!(|S| − 1)!
d!


∑
i∈W
[
SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S\{jk}
− SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S
]
|W |

 ,
(9)
for all jk ∈ D.
On the other hand, the Banzhaf value of (cW ,D) is the d-dimensional vector
β(cW ) = (β1(cW ), . . . , βd(cW )) such that:
βjk(cW ) =
1
2d−1
∑
jk∈S, S⊆D


∑
i∈W
[
SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S\{jk}
− SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S
]
|W |

 , (10)
for all jk ∈ D.
Their respective axiomatizations5 point out a crucial difference between (9) and (10):
the Shapley value satisfies the efficiency axiom6, i.e.
∑d
k=1 φjk(cW ) = cW (D), whereas
the Banzahf value does not, except when d = 2. On one hand, such axiom conveys
the idea that there is an aggregate amount of risk capital to be apportioned among
institutions in distress. On the other hand, perhaps it is helpful to avoid thinking of risk
as a unique object to be divided, given its specific characteristics. Loosely speaking, we
stress that both values can be employed based on good motivations.
Clearly, we can say that jk is a dummy institution if and only if ∀ i ∈ W , ∀S ⊆ D,
SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S\{jk}
= SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S . The economic meaning of a dummy institution is simple:
its marginal contribution to overall contagion is always zero.
A special discussion should be devoted to the so-called no undercut property (see
Denault (2001), Def. 3), which can be reformulated as follows: given an allocation
(Kj1 , . . . ,Kjd) for the game (cW ,D), for all S ⊆ D, the inequality∑
jk∈S
Kjk ≤ cW (S), (11)
must hold. The condition (11) has a twofold meaning. The first one is technical: any
allocation (Kj1 , . . . ,Kjd) satisfying it for all S is in the core of the cooperative game,
5There exists a large number of contributions on axiomatizations of values in literature, see for
example Feltkamp (1995) and van den Brink and van der Laan (1998).
6Nonetheless, some recent contributions have been published on the Shapley value without the
efficiency axiom, see Einy and Haimanko (2011) for simple voting games and Casajus (2014) for different
classes of games.
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consequently if at least one allocation of this kind exists, the core is non-empty. The
second meaning is strictly connected to a financial aspect (see Denault (2001)): an
undercut happens when a portfolio allocation exceeds the risk capital that the whole
group of institutions would face.
Relying on previous results, we can establish some sufficient conditions for positivity
of Φ(cW ) and β(cW ), i.e. to ensure that all their coordinates are non-negative, meaning
that each distressed institution brings a positive marginal contribution to systemic risk.
Proposition 15. If for all S ∈ 2D \ ∅ and for all jk ∈ S the following hypotheses are
verified:
1. SCoV aR
τ1|τ2
i|S\{jk}
> SCoV aR
τ1|τ2
i|S ;
2.
∑
jk∈S\{jk}
Xjk ≤ ESτ2
(∑
jk∈S\{j}
Xjk
)
;
3.
∑
jk∈S
Xjk ≤ ESτ2
(∑
jk∈S
Xjk
)
,
then φjk(cW ) ≥ 0 and βjk(cW ) for all jk ∈ S.
Proof. Given a coalition of distressed institutions S 6= ∅ and any element jk ∈ S, we
can apply Proposition 10 to two coalitions S and S \ {jk} by reformulating its three
hypotheses. Since by Proposition 10 we have that SCoESτ1|τ2
i|S\{jk}
≥ SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|S , then
all terms in the sums in (9) and (10) are positive.
5 Application
To illustrate how the SCoES risk measure behaves in practice we examine the evolution
of European Sovereign Credit Spreads (CDS) over a period that includes the Eurozone
sovereign debt crisis of 2012. Specifically, we investigate the evolution over time of the
Shapley–Value SCoES induced by the cooperative Game where the Germany acts as
the only “safe” country, as described in the previous sections. The potentially distressed
countries are: Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. We
consider a panel of daily CDS spreads over the period from July 21st, 2008 to De-
cember 30th, 2014 except for the Greece for which the data are available only until
March 8, 2012. We use US–denominated sovereign CDS for each country using data
obtained from Datastream. Our aim is to assess how the events related to the Euro-
pean sovereign debt crisis impact the safety of the most important economy in the Euro
area, using the provided risk measure and the associated risk measurement framework
based on the cooperative game. A similar empirical investigation has been conducted
by Bernardi and Catania (2015) using stock market data of the major European finan-
cial indexes, Lucas et al. (2014) using dynamic Generalised Autoregressive Score (GAS)
models on CDS, and Engle et al. (2014) again using stock market data of European in-
dividual institutions, and Blasques et al. (2014) using spatial GAS models on European
sovereign debt CDS.
Major financial events affecting the Euro area during the considered period are col-
lected in Table 2. Since EU countries have been affected by the crisis to different degree,
sovereign credit spreads in Europe are strongly correlated. Figure 1 shows the evolution
of the credit default spreads in log basis points for the period covered by our analy-
sis. Visual inspection of the series reveals clear common patterns particularly between
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Name Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 1% Str. Lev. JB
Belgium -21.912 13.854 -0.049 2.726 -0.422 12.144 -7.999 5477.445
France -23.002 18.643 0.023 3.155 -0.213 10.068 -9.525 3257.265
Germany -33.747 30.839 -0.017 3.367 -0.368 21.499 -9.535 22264.754
Greece -48.983 23.611 0.401 5.183 -1.029 17.169 -13.700 6081.685
Italy -42.675 34.358 0.011 4.237 -0.579 17.933 -12.229 14571.710
Netherlands -25.672 18.572 -0.047 3.028 -0.466 13.130 -9.669 6721.984
Portugal -61.177 26.909 0.064 4.320 -1.616 33.500 -10.911 61104.578
Spain -35.180 27.174 0.020 4.137 -0.078 11.616 -11.781 4824.268
Table 1: Summary statistics of the panel of country specific CDS spreads for the period
beginning on July 21, 2008 and ending on December 20, 2014. For the Greece the period goes
from July 21, 2008 to March 8, 2012. The seventh column, denoted by “1% Str. Lev.” is the
1% empirical quantile of the returns distribution, while the eight column, denoted by “JB” is
the value of the Jarque-Berá test-statistics.
Netherlands and Germany on the one hand and Italy and Spain on the other hand.
As expected, the evolution of the Greek CDS strongly differs from those of the other
countries in the sample. Summary statistics of log CDS returns multiplied by 100 are
reported in Table 1.
In order to calculate the SCoES risk measure a parametric assumption about the
joint distribution of the involved CDS log–returns should be made. Although not always
supported by the empirical evidence, we assume that the CDS returns are jointly Gaus-
sian. The Gaussian assumption is not only convenient but it represents also a common
choice for practical applications, and it favours the interpretation of the estimation re-
sults as the output of a graphical model, see Koller and Friedman (2009). Nevertheless
the Gaussian distribution can be easily replaced by either another parametric distri-
bution or by more involved dynamic models that describe the evolution over time of
the CDS, see, for example, Bernardi and Catania (2015). Proposition 16 in Appendix
6 provides the analytical formulas to calculate V aR, ES, SCoV aR and SCoES under
the Gaussian assumption. As far as parameter estimation is concerned we apply the
Graphical–Lasso algorithm of Friedman et al. (2008), which allows for sparse covariance
estimation. The tuning parameter that regulates the amount of sparsity in the covari-
ance structure has been fixed at λN = 2
√
log p
N
, where N denotes the sample size, as
suggested by the theory Ravikumar et al. (2011), see also Hastie et al. (2015) and ref-
erences therein.
To analyse more deeply the impact of the recent European Sovereign debt crisis, we
estimate recursively the SCoES over the sample period using a rolling window.
Moreover, to obtain results more robust to temporary short–term shocks affecting
the considered economies, we consider weekly log–CDS returns. Specifically, at each
point in time we estimate the SCoES risk measure using a window of N = 26 more
recent weekly observations, and then we run the cooperative game to get the Shapley
Value with τ1 = τ2 = 5%. It is worth mentioning that, with p = 8 institutions, we
are going to estimate d = 44 ≫ 26 = N parameters. The Graphical–Lasso method of
Friedman et al. (2008) delivers consistent estimates of the parameters even when the
number of parameters is greater than the dimension of the sample, see Hastie et al.
(2015) and Tibshirani (1996, 2011) for further details.
Results are reported in Figure 2, for the period before the onset of the Greek crisis
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Date Event
Mar. 9, 2009 the peak of the onset of the recent GFC.
Oct. 18, 2009 Greece announces doubling of budget deficit.
Mar. 3, 2010 EU offers financial help to Greece.
Apr. 23, 2010 Greek Prime Minister calls for Eurozone–IMF rescue package.
Apr. 23, 2010 Greece achievement of 18bn USD bailout from EFSF, IMF and bilateral loans.
Nov. 29, 2010 Ireland achievement of 113bn USD bailout from EU, IMF and EFSF.
May 05, 2011 the ECB bails out Portugal.
July 21, 2011 Greece is bailed out.
Dec. 22, 2011 ECB launches the first Long-Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO).
Feb. 12, 2012 Greece passes its most severe austerity package yet.
Mar. 1, 2012 ECB launches the second LTRO.
July 26, 2012
unexpectedly, the ECB president Mario Draghi, announces that
“The ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro”.
Oct. 8, 2012 European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is inaugurated.
April 07, 2013
the conference of the Portuguese Prime Minister regarding
the high court’s block of austerity plans.
Aug. 23, 2013 the Eurozone crisis leads to more bankruptcies in Italy.
Sep. 12, 2013 European Parliament approves new unified bank supervision system.
Table 2: Financial crisis timeline.
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Figure 1: Daily evolution of Credit default swap spreads of eight European sovereigns, from
July 21, 2008 to December 20, 2014 in log basis points. Vertical dashed lines represent major
financial downturns: for a detailed description see Table 2.
(2a), as well as for the subsequent period (2b). For both periods, the bottom panel
reports the overall impact of the distress of the remaining countries over the German
economy as measured by the SCoES. Throughout the sample period, the overall risk
of Germany due to the potential distress of one or more of the remaining European
countries is high, until mid 2011. At that time, the level suddenly decreases to the lower
level of about 0.09, as a consequence of the bailouts of Portugal and Greece, in May
and July 2011, respectively. The overall risk still remain at the level of 0.09 till the
April 2013 a few months later the announcement of the implementation of the of the
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)
in October 2012. If is worth noting that the launch of the first Long–Term Refinancing
Operation (LTRO) by ECB in December 2011 and the second LTRO in March 2012
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Figure 2: (Top panel): Shapley Value using the SCoES at the 5% level of Germany with
respect to all the remaining countries. (Bottom panel): Overall risk of Germany measured by
the SCoES when all the remaining countries are in distress. Vertical dashed lines represent
major financial downturns: for a detailed description see Table 2.
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Figure 3: (Top panel): Banzhaf Value using the SCoES at the 5% level of Germany with
respect to all the remaining countries. (Bottom panel): Overall risk of Germany measured by
the SCoES when all the remaining countries are in distress. Vertical dashed lines represent
major financial downturns: for a detailed description see Table 2.
only had a moderate impact on the overall risk that decreased till mid 2012 and the
unexpected strongest defence of the Euro of the ECB President Mario Draghi (July 26,
2012), did not contribute to reduce the risk of the Germany.
Concerning the evolution of the Shapley values reported in the top panel of Figure
2 and the Banzhaf Value in Figure 3, they can be interpreted as the normalised country
risk factors. As expected, the two approaches provide different contributions to risk, in
particular during the onset of the European crisis, reflecting their different properties.
More precisely, the Shapley solution, suggests that, during the period in between the
bailout of Ireland (November 29, 2010) and the bailout of Portugal (May 5, 2011), the
most severe source of risk for the Germany’s economy is represented by the Greece,
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while Spain, Italy and France contribute less, see Figure 2. The picture by Banzhaf is
a little bit different since, during the same period, the most important source of risk
for Germany is Belgium, followed by Greece, a result which is a little bit surprisingly.
Afterwards, the overall contributions of European countries converge, for both methods.
The failure of the Greek austerity package in February 2012 suddenly increases the
riskiness of Greece which is comparable only with that of Portugal at the beginning of
2011. Interestingly, the proposed approach is able to capture the most important events
that happened during European sovereign debt crisis of 2012, as reported in Table 2.
6 Conclusions and further developments
This paper presents a cooperative game among distressed institutions to assess the
potential damage done by all possible coalitions in distress. At this aim, a new risk
measure which features some properties of the standard Expected Shortfall in a financial
framework where some institutions are distressed and contagion threatens the remaining
safe institutions is developed. Standard solution concepts like Shapley value and Banzhaf
value can be helpful to measure the marginal contributions to systemic risk.
Our study of the European sovereign debt crisis of 2012 provides empirical support for
the ability of the proposed cooperative Game approach to systemic risk measurement
to effectively capture the dynamic evolution of the overall riskiness of the European
countries. Furthermore, the proposed risk measurement framework is able to identify
the major sources of risk and the risk contributions.
Further extensions of such a theoretical setup can be conceived, in terms of more
complex and precise cost functions to be employed in the cooperative game. Moreover, a
detailed analysis of correlations among distressed institutions might give rise to different
game structures, such as a priori unions or bounded forms of cooperation which can
be described with the help of graphs. In such cases, a model with some constraints
might be necessary to determine the characteristics of risk transmission and the related
consequences on the systemic risk. It is possible that a given structure with certain links
among institutions can minimize the contagion risk.
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Appendix
In this Appendix we provide analytical formulas for the computation of the V aR, ES,
SCoV aR and SCoES, as formally defined in the previous sections, under the assumption
of the joint Gaussian distribution of the involved variables.
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Proposition 16. Let X ∼ Np (µ,Σ) where µ ∈ Rp is a vector of location parameters
and Σ is a (p× p)– symmetric variance-covariance matrix. Consider the transformation
Z =
[
Xi,
∑p
k=1,k 6=iXk
]′
, for i = 1, 2, . . . , p, then Z ∼ N2 (µZ ,ΣZ), with
µZ =

µi, p∑
k=1,k 6=i
µk


′
(12)
ΣZ =


σ2(Xi)
∑p
k=1,k 6=i σi,k
∑p
k=1,k 6=i σi,k σ
2
(∑p
k=1,k 6=iXk
)

 , (13)
where
∑p
k=1,k 6=i σi,k denotes the covariance between Xi and
∑p
k=1,k 6=iXk, and σ
2(·)
denotes the variance of Xi. Under the previous assumptions the VaR, ES, of Xi, for
i = 1, 2, . . . , p are calculated as follows:
ν̂τ2i ≡ V aRτ2

 p∑
k=1,k 6=i
Xk


=
p∑
k=1,k 6=i
µk +
√√√√√σ2

 p∑
k=1,k 6=i
Xk

Φ−1 (τ2) (14)
ψ̂τ2i ≡ ESτ2

 p∑
k=1,k 6=i
µk


=
p∑
k=1,k 6=i
µk −
√√√√√σ2

 p∑
k=1,k 6=i
Xk

 φ (ν̂τ2i )
Φ (ν̂τ2i )
, (15)
see, Nadarajah et al. (2014) and Bernardi (2013), while the SCoVaR and SCoES be-
comes
γˆ
τ1|τ2
i|
∑
k 6=iXk
≡ SCoV aR
τ1|τ2
i|
∑
k 6=i Xk
:= y ∈ R ∋
FXi,
∑
k 6=i Xk
(
y,
∑p
k=1,k 6=iXk ≤ ν̂
τ2
i
)
τ2
= τ1 (16)
ςˆ
τ1|τ2
i|
∑
k=1,k 6=iXk
≡ SCoES
τ1|τ2
i|
∑
k 6=i
=
p∑
k 6=i
µk −
√
σ2 (Xi)

φ(γˆτ1|τ2
i|
∑
k 6=iXk
)
Φ

 ν̂τ2i − ργˆτ1|τ2i|∑k 6=i Xk√
1− ρ2


+ρφ (ν̂τ2i )Φ

 γˆτ1|τ2i|∑k 6=iXk − ρν̂τ2i√
1− ρ2



 , (17)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , p, where FX,Y (·) denotes the joint cdf of the random variables (X,Y ).
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Equation (16) implicitly defines the SCoV aR as the value of y that solves the conditional
cdf of the involved variables equal to τ1. The solution always exists and is unique because
the involved random variables are absolutely continuous.
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